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Summary
In this paper, I examine recent phenomenological research on 
both depressive and manic episodes, with the intention of show-
ing how phenomenologically oriented studies can help us over-
come the apparently paradoxical nature of mixed states. First, 
I argue that some of the symptoms included in the diagnostic 
criteria for depressive and manic episodes in the DSM-5 are not 
actually essential features of these episodes. Second, I recon-
sider the category of major depressive disorder (MDD) from 
the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, arguing 
that severe depressive episodes should not be characterized by 
any particular moods (such as sadness, hopelessness, or guilt), 
and should instead be characterized by a diminished capacity 
for finding ourselves situated in and attuned to the world at all. 
In other words, the affective dimension of depression should 
be characterized as a change in the way we have moods, not 
as a change from one kind of mood to another. Third, I turn to 
mania, arguing that manic episodes, taken as the opposite of 
depressive episodes, should be characterized not by any partic-
ular moods (such as euphoria, grandiosity, or even irritability), 
but should instead be characterized by an enhanced or height-
ened capacity for finding ourselves situated in and attuned to 
the world. In other words, the affective dimension of mania, like 
the affective dimension of depression, should be understood as 
a change in the way we have moods, not as a change from one 
kind of mood to another. Fourth, I return to the phenomenon of 
mixed states and argue that the affective dimension of depres-
sion and mania, when conceived along the phenomenological 
lines I set forth in the previous sections, dissolves the paradox 
of mixed states by showing that the essential characteristics of 
depression and mania cannot and do not coincide. Many cases 
of mixed states are diagnosed because moods that we take to 
be essential features of either depression or mania arise within 
the context of what is considered to be the opposite kind of epi-
sode (e.g. dysphoria, typically associated with depression, often 
arises in what is otherwise considered a manic state). However, 
if we conceive of the affective dimension of depression as a 
decrease in the degree to which one is situated in and attune to 
the world through moods, and the affective dimension of mania 
as an increase in the degree to which one is situated in and at-
tuned to the world through moods, then the particular mood 
one finds oneself in is simply irrelevant to the diagnosis of either 
depression or mania. As a result, the manifestation of any par-
ticular moods in what otherwise seems to be a pure manic or 
depressive episode does not constitute a mixed state.
Key words
Depression • Mania • Mixed state • Phenomenology • Psychopathology
Correspondence
Anthony Vincent Fernandez, University of South Florida, Department of Philosophy, Tampa, Florida, USA • Email: avf@mail.usf.edu
Reconsidering the affective dimension of depression and mania:  
towards a phenomenological dissolution of the paradox of mixed states
A.V. Fernandez
University of South Florida, Department of Philosophy. Tampa, Florida, USA
Introduction
Both the general public and professional psychiatrists 
typically conceive of depression and mania as polar op-
posites – embodied in the term “bipolar disorder” itself. 
However, the possibility of mixed states (i.e. states that 
incorporate symptoms considered essential to both de-
pressive and manic episodes) has a long history. In his 
book, Manic Depressive Insanity and Paranoia, Emil 
Kraepelin clearly elucidated the possible manifestations 
of such states 1. Some authors even point as far back as 
Hippocrates and Aretaeus of Cappadocia, arguing that 
these ancient physicians described cases of melancholic 
symptoms appearing during the course of behaviour that 
we would today characterise as manic 2-5. 
The formal definition of mixed states, given in the DSM-
5, consists of either a state meeting full criteria for a man-
ic or hypomanic episode, accompanied by at least three 
depressive symptoms, or a state meeting full criteria for a 
depressive episode, accompanied by at least three manic 
or hypomanic symptoms 6. This shares some similarities 
with earlier conceptions of mixed states, but there is one 
important difference in the DSM. While Kraepelin did 
not conceive of depression and mania as opposing poles, 
the DSM conception implies the opposition of the two 
phenomena, thereby establishing mixed states as a prob-
lematic, if not paradoxical, form of human subjectivity. 
Many of the particular symptoms of each kind of episode 
are clearly juxtaposed. For example, a major depressive 
episode is characterised by a depressed mood, while a 
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manic episode is characterised by an elevated or expan-
sive mood. Another characteristic of a major depressive 
episode is loss of interest or pleasure in activities, while 
a manic episode often includes excessive involvement in 
activities that have potential for painful consequences. As 
a result of this characterisation of depressive and manic 
episodes, mixed states of any sort (whether they be pre-
dominantly depressive or manic) present us with a kind 
of paradox. If depression and mania are, in fact, polar 
opposites, how can it be that essential features of both 
disorders manifest simultaneously?
Questions of this kind have given rise to a large body of 
psychological and psychiatric research that attempts to 
reconceive the essential features of depression and ma-
nia with the intention of bestowing some sense on the 
strange phenomenon of mixed states 7-23. One account, 
made popular by Kraepelin, characterises mixed states 
as the outcome of prolonged periods of transition be-
tween depressive and manic episodes, or vice versa. Ac-
cording to this account, the movement from one kind of 
episode to the other is typically either rapid or includes 
a transition through a non-episodic state. However, in 
some cases a person moves from one kind of episode to 
the other without the typically rapid transition, thereby 
displaying a mixture of what seem to be two opposing 
states 1 4. Another, more radical account claims that de-
pression and mania are not actually two opposing poles. 
Instead, mania is a severe mental disorder, while depres-
sion is a less severe disorder on the same spectrum. Ac-
cording to this conception of depression and mania, the 
opposing poles, or extremes, are actually mania and a 
non-episodic state. Because depression stands at a point 
between these states, it is not unusual to find depressive 
and manic symptoms arising together 8.
While either of these accounts might explain the pos-
sibility of mixed states, in this paper I wish to consider 
another solution. Rather than explaining mixed states, I 
attempt to explain them away. In other words, I argue 
that mixed states may not actually exist – instead, they 
are artefacts of inaccurate diagnostic constructs that have 
been perpetuated in light of misattributions of the essen-
tial characteristics of depressive and manic episodes.
This paper is divided into four main sections. First, I argue 
that some of the symptoms included in the diagnostic cri-
teria for depressive and manic episodes in the DSM-5 are 
not actually essential features of these episodes. Second, 
I reconsider the category of major depressive disorder 
(MDD) from the perspective of phenomenological psy-
chopathology, arguing that severe depressive episodes 
should not be characterised by any particular moods (such 
as sadness, hopelessness, or guilt), and should instead be 
characterised by a diminished capacity for finding our-
selves situated in and attuned to the world at all. In other 
words, the affective dimension of depression should be 
characterised as a change in the way we have moods, 
and not as a change from one kind of mood to another. 
Third, I turn to mania, arguing that manic episodes, taken 
as the opposite of depressive episodes, should be char-
acterised not by any particular moods (such as euphoria, 
grandiosity, or even irritability), and should instead be 
characterised by an enhanced or heightened capacity for 
finding ourselves situated in and attuned to the world. In 
other words, the affective dimension of mania, like the 
affective dimension of depression, should be understood 
as a change in the way we have moods, and not as a 
change from one kind of mood to another. Fourth, I re-
turn to the phenomenon of mixed states and argue that 
the affective dimension of depression and mania, when 
conceived along the phenomenological lines I set forth 
in the previous sections, dissolves the paradox of mixed 
states by showing that the essential characteristics of de-
pression and mania cannot and do not coincide. Many 
cases of mixed states are diagnosed because moods that 
we take to be essential features of either depression or 
mania arise within the context of what is considered to 
be the opposite kind of episode (e.g. dysphoria, typically 
associated with depression, often arises in what is other-
wise considered a manic state). However, if we conceive 
of the affective dimension of depression as a decrease 
in the degree to which one is situated in and attuned to 
the world through moods, and the affective dimension of 
mania as an increase in the degree to which one is situ-
ated in and attuned to the world through moods, then the 
particular mood one finds oneself in is simply irrelevant 
to the diagnosis of either depression or mania. As a result, 
the manifestation of any particular moods in what oth-
erwise seems to be a pure manic or depressive episode 
does not constitute a mixed state.
Before I begin, it will help to briefly clarify what I mean 
by “essential characteristics” and by “phenomenology”. 
Essential characteristics can be defined in a variety of 
ways. The essence of something can be understood as 
that which makes something what it is, in the sense that 
if this characteristic were removed, the being in question 
would necessarily become something other than what it 
is. Another way of defining essence is as that essential 
feature that stands as a ground, or source, of the other 
features of the phenomenon in question. In philosophi-
cal phenomenology, both senses of essence, or essential 
characteristics, are taken together. Phenomenologists 
study those characteristics of human subjectivity and ex-
istence that must hold for something to count as human 
subjectivity or existence. And these characteristics are, in 
turn, conditions for a lived world showing up at all.
This brings us to the issue of the definition of phenom-
enology. The term has a variety of meanings, being used 
in psychological  l, sociological  l, anthropological  l, and 
philosophical research, among other domains. While 
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to be any core symptom around which the rest are organ-
ised or motivated. In light of this, it is reasonable to ask 
how such a set of symptoms became the symptoms by 
which MDD is diagnosed. 
There are a variety of ways we can formulate such a 
question, and each formulation will give us a different 
answer. A historical formulation, for example, would ask 
about the actual events that led to the selection of the 
particular criteria in the DSM. A more philosophical for-
mulation, however, might ask why the particular kinds of 
symptoms listed in the DSM have been selected. What is 
it about these symptoms that made them attractive for use 
as DSM diagnostic criteria? This is the kind of question I 
wish to address here.
Many of the symptoms of MDD, including (1), (2), (7), (8) 
and (9) listed above, seem to be experiential, or subjec-
tive. That is to say, they are symptoms that seem to be 
observable primarily from the perspective of the patient 
herself. Others, such as (3) and (6), seem physiological, 
rather than primarily behavioural or experiential. How-
ever, nearly all of these symptoms come with some kind 
of qualification that allows for it to be met, or checked 
off, as a result of observations made by a clinician, fam-
ily member, or close acquaintance, rather than the pa-
tient herself. For example, depressed mood, diminished 
interest or pleasure in activities, and diminished ability 
to think or concentrate are all followed by the qualifica-
tion that these items can be met by observations made 
by others. Such a possibility for diagnosis is also implied 
in the physiological symptom of significant weight loss 
or weight gain, as this item includes the qualification, 
“when not dieting”, which integrates a behavioural char-
acter into the symptom. Out of all the experiential or sub-
jective symptoms that can be used to make a diagnosis, 
only one – feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inap-
propriate guilt – does not include the qualification that it 
can also be confirmed by outside observation, rather than 
just first-person report.
It follows from this insight into the preponderance of be-
havioural, or behaviourally qualified, diagnostic criteria 
that what makes a particular symptom likely to make the 
list of characteristic features of a psychiatric disorder is 
the quality of being easily observable. Each symptom list-
ed in the DSM can be quickly and easily observed by a 
clinician, patient, family member or close acquaintance, 
or some combination thereof. 
The reason for qualifying symptoms in such a way as to al-
low for observation or confirmation from multiple sources 
is clear enough. Easily observable symptoms expedite the 
process of diagnosis and, in turn, reduce the time it takes 
to implement targeted interventions – whether these be 
psychopharmaceuticals or psychotherapies. However, 
the symptomatology of many of the DSM categories of 
disorder still leaves one wanting. The most easily observ-
this paper is on phenomenological psychopathology, I 
use the term phenomenology in the philosophical, rather 
than the psychological or psychiatric, sense. In psychol-
ogy, phenomenology is typically understood as a method 
for the qualitative study of subjective experience. Such 
data is obtained through avenues such as surveys, first-
person reports, and interviews. In psychiatry, the term 
can have an even broader meaning, being used to refer 
to any observable symptoms of a disorder – in this sense, 
even the DSM is phenomenological. Philosophical phe-
nomenology, by contrast, while still concerned with hu-
man subjectivity and lived experience, has its roots in 
the Kantian tradition of transcendental philosophy. What 
this means is that phenomenology, as a discipline within 
philosophy, is a research program aimed not at describ-
ing particular qualitative differences in experience, but 
instead at describing the form or structure of subjectivity 
and experience in general.
In this sense, philosophical phenomenology is still descrip-
tive, but its focus is primarily on what we might broadly 
construe as “form” – although “structure” [Struktur] is the 
more common coinage, at least among the German phe-
nomenologists. In some cases, phenomenologists speak 
of the structure of consciousness or human existence as a 
whole, while at other times they speak of structures in the 
plural, referring to specific characteristics of consciousness 
or human existence. Some of the specific characteristics, 
sometimes referred to as “existentials”, include temporal-
ity; spatiality; intersubjectivity; selfhood; embodiment; and 
situatedness or affectivity. In this paper, I focus primarily 
on the way subjects are situated in, attuned to and affected 
by their world through moods.
Symptomatology in phenomenology  
and mainstream psychiatry
The DSM-5 organises and distinguishes its categories of 
disorder by reference to symptom checklists. The kinds of 
symptoms listed for each disorder are varied, but there is 
predominance of behavioural criteria or, at the very least, 
criteria that can be interpreted behaviourally. A diagno-
sis of major depressive disorder (MDD), for example, is 
made when a patient presents with five or more of the fol-
lowing symptoms (with at least one of the symptoms be-
ing the first or second on the list) over a period of at least 
two weeks: (1) depressed mood; (2) diminished interest 
or pleasure; (3) significant weight loss or weight gain; (4) 
insomnia or hypersomnia; (5) psychomotor agitation or 
retardation; (6) fatigue or loss of energy; (7) feelings of 
worthlessness or excessive guilt; (8) diminished ability to 
think or concentrate; (9) recurrent thoughts of death, sui-
cidal ideation, or a suicide attempt or plan  6.
Many of these symptoms seem dissimilar and unrelated, 
especially considering the fact that there does not seem 
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The phenomenology of depression
The last decade has seen a renewed interest in the phe-
nomenology of depression. Figures such as Kevin Aho 25, 
Thomas Fuchs 26-29, Matthew Ratcliffe 30-33, and Giovanni 
Stanghellini 34 and René Rosfort  35- 36 have all contributed 
to this growing body of literature. Each of these phenom-
enological psychopathologists has developed a focus on 
a particular aspect of depressive disorders, but there re-
mains substantial overlap in their work. Some have fo-
cused on issues of temporality, or shifts in the way time 
and the temporal flow manifest in cases of depressive 
episodes  25 29 32. Some focus on issues of embodiment, or 
changes in the way people experience their body or have 
bodily engagements with the world 25-28. Others focus on 
the relationships between depressive episodes and other 
disorders, such as borderline personality disorder 35 36.
In spite of the varied interests of these phenomenologi-
cal psychopathologists, there is one point of focus that 
they all share. Every phenomenological psychopatholo-
gist who studies depression must, to some extent, con-
sider the affective dimension of depressive episodes. This 
focus has taken a variety of forms, and a few competing 
interpretations of the affective dimension of depressive 
episodes have been offered. However, each phenom-
enological account of this feature of depression might 
be understood as an attempt to make sense the central, 
but rather ambiguous, symptom referred to as “depressed 
mood”. The DSM describes this symptom with the fol-
lowing words: “Depressed mood most of the day, nearly 
every day, as indicated by either subjective report (e.g. 
feels sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by others 
(e.g. appears tearful)” 6. As is made clear in this brief de-
scription, the DSM does not actually include a definition 
of depressed mood. Instead, it offers the clinician a few 
examples − sadness, emptiness, and hopelessness – and 
in so doing leaves open the possibility for other kinds 
of moods or affective phenomena to fulfil this criterion, 
while giving very little instruction on how to go about 
deciding what other affective phenomena or changes in 
mood actually count as “depressed mood”.
This very ambiguity is used by Stanghellini as the starting 
point for one of his phenomenological investigations of 
depression and mania. As he says, “In ICD-10, depressed 
mood is defined quantitatively as ‘lowered mood’ and it 
is also assumed that the differentiating criteria between 
normal and pathological sadness is merely quantitative. 
Depressed mood is also used as a synonym to ‘sadness’, 
assuming that persons affected by major depression feel 
sad – rather than having no feelings at all” 34. As he goes 
on to explain, the ambiguity inherent in the poorly de-
fined symptom of “depressed mood” in both the ICD and 
DSM create difficulties in drawing boundaries between 
pathological and non-pathological moods and affective 
able symptoms are not necessarily the most essential, or 
characteristic, of the disorder in question. The authors of 
the DSM, however, do not seem to acknowledge this dif-
ference. As they say in the preface to the DSM-5, “… the 
current diagnostic criteria are the best available descrip-
tion of how mental disorders are expressed and can be 
recognized by trained clinicians” (my emphasis) 6. And, 
further, they claim that the DSM is used by researchers 
and clinicians who “…strive for a common language to 
communicate the essential characteristics of mental dis-
orders presented by their patients” (my emphasis) 6.
While the assumption that the easily observable symp-
toms listed in the DSM are also essential characteristics 
of these disorders is problematic, the privileging of easily 
observable symptoms within the context of a diagnostic 
manual is not problematic in itself. As said above, there 
are legitimate practical reasons for the privileging of such 
symptoms. However, there is another issue that, when 
combined with the privileging of easily observable symp-
toms over essential characteristics, problematises the 
situation. This additional issue is that of validity. While 
the DSM categories are, for the most part, reliable – in the 
sense that most clinicians, when presented with the same 
patient or the same symptom cluster, will make the same 
diagnosis – they are not necessarily valid. Validity does 
not have a single definition within the context of psychi-
atric research and practice, but it is often used to refer to 
a disorder being “real”, which many take to mean that it 
has a distinct neurobiological cause, or biomarker. Pro-
ponents of the DSM have promised time and again that 
the DSM categories of disorder will be neurobiologically 
validated in the near future, but this promise has been left 
unfulfilled for the past few decades.
Another kind of validity, and one that is particularly rel-
evant to philosophical phenomenological investigations 
of psychiatric disorders, is construct validity. Jablensky 
and Kendell explain that a category of disorder has con-
struct validity when it “is based on a coherent, explicit set 
of defining features” 24. Phenomenological psychopathol-
ogy can assist in the project of offering coherent features 
by finding essential characteristics of a disorder that help 
us make sense of other, less foundational characteristics. 
And, further, it can assist in the project of offering explicit 
features by supplying careful and robust descriptions of 
the essential characteristics.
In the following sections, I consider depression, mania 
and mixed states, in turn, from a phenomenological per-
spective. In so doing, I illustrate the way in which phe-
nomenology can assist in the project of discovering and 
accurately describing essential features of disorder. Final-
ly, I argue that this kind of phenomenological research 
can help us overcome issues inherent in our conceptu-
alisations of disorders and disordered phenomena, such 
as mixed states.
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thereby making it a distinct affective phenomenon in its 
own right (as opposed to an actual shift in the degree to 
which we can be affected by the world).
This phenomenon of the loss of feeling is characteristic of 
the 20th century conception of melancholia, which was 
further developed by historical phenomenological psy-
chopathologists such as Hubertus Tellenbach 39, but also 
plays a central role in contemporary works by Stanghell-
ini and Fuchs. Stanghellini refers to a loss of emotional 
resonance as characteristic of melancholic depression 34, 
while Fuchs focuses on the ways in which melancholia 
alters our embodiment, referring instead to a loss of bod-
ily resonance that incorporates a diminished capacity for 
perception (e.g. food tastes bland) 28.
Stanghellini, in investigating the loss of feeling associated 
with depressive episodes, points out that the DSM does in 
fact refer to such a phenomenon, but immediately down-
plays its importance, or even eliminates it as a legitimate 
expression of “depressed mood”, by allowing for the cli-
nician’s observations of the patient’s behaviour to over-
ride the patient’s descriptions of his own experience. This 
comes to light in the DSM-5 in the line, “In some cases, 
sadness may be denied at first but may subsequently be 
elicited by interview (e.g. by pointing out that the individ-
ual looks as if he or she is about to cry). In some individu-
als who complain of feeling ‘blah’, having no feelings, or 
feeling anxious, the presence of a depressed mood can 
be inferred from the person’s facial expressions and de-
meanour”   34. In other words, even if a patient does in 
fact undergo an existential shift in which his capacity for 
being affected by his world is diminished, and he subse-
quently expresses this shift in a psychiatric interview, the 
clinician’s “expert” interpretation of the patient’s facial 
expressions supplies overriding evidence for the fact that 
the patient is actually sad (thereby having what the DSM 
considers to be a “depressed mood”). Such lapses into 
behaviourism undercut the very possibility of alternative 
interpretations of the existential changes occurring on the 
side of the patient’s subjectivity.
Continuing in the vein of research opened up by Fuchs, 
Stanghellini and others, I have developed an account 
of the affective dimension of depressive episodes that is 
similar to their accounts of the loss of emotional and bod-
ily resonance, but focuses more heavily on the distinction 
between this kind of change and a change in mood 40. 
I argue that one of the essential features of a major de-
pressive episode is – contrary to the popular account of 
depression as a kind of mood – a degradation or erosion 
of the capacity for having moods at all. In this sense, the 
fundamental affective shift in depressive episodes is in 
what Heidegger refers to as Befindlichkeit – commonly 
translated as “situatedness” or “affectivity” – rather than 
Stimmung – commonly translated as mood, atmosphere, 
or even tune, in the sense of tuning an instrument. Ac-
states. Adequately describing what it is that we are try-
ing to express or point to when we refer to “depressed 
mood” can, as he says, go a long way towards overcom-
ing controversies over the pathological/non-pathological 
boundaries, at least in the case of depression.
Much of the recent phenomenological research on de-
scribing and defining what exactly we mean by a “de-
pressed mood” has come from the work of Ratcliffe. Two 
papers in particular – one on deep guilt  31 and one on 
hopelessness 33 – bring to light the distinct characteristics 
that these moods take in the context of depressive disor-
ders. In order to adequately characterise these moods, 
Ratcliffe accounts for them as what he terms “existential 
feelings”. The concept of existential feeling is Ratcliffe’s 
own development, but it is owed in large part to Martin 
Heidegger’s account of moods and ground moods in Be-
ing and Time 37 and Fundamental Concepts of Metaphys-
ics 38. Existential feelings are understood as all-encom-
passing, and even world-disclosing, affective phenomena 
that are pre-intentional (meaning that they are not about, 
or directed towards, anything in particular), thereby 
shaping the meaningfulness of our world as a whole. In 
the case of deep guilt, for example, the person perceives 
himself as being guilty as such (i.e. not guilty for any dis-
tinct reason). Further, this deep guilt, pervading the per-
son’s lived world in its entirety, determines the kinds of 
intentional feelings and emotions (i.e. feelings and emo-
tions that are about, or directed toward, something) that 
can manifest. Only feelings and emotions that conform 
to the all-encompassing guiltiness of the person’s lived 
world can arise. Hopelessness, or what Ratcliffe refers to 
as “radical hopelessness”, is a similar phenomenon that 
is also common in patients diagnosed with MDD. In this 
case, what is so radical about the hopelessness of depres-
sion is that it eliminates the possibility for hoping at all. 
While most cases of hopelessness are contextual – in the 
sense that the feeling of hopelessness is linked to the fact 
that the person finds herself in a hopeless situation – the 
hopelessness of the person in a depressive episode is not 
a response to any particular context and a change in con-
text will not cause the hopelessness to subside. This kind 
of hopelessness can therefore be considered existential. 
It is the person’s very existence, or subjectivity, that has 
undergone a profound change.
While Ratcliffe’s accounts enrich the rather impoverished 
descriptions of “depressed mood” in the DSM, others 
have focused on a different feature of the affective di-
mension of depression that, while historically important, 
is mostly ignored in the contemporary symptomatology. 
This is the phenomenon of the loss of feeling, or what is 
sometimes referred to as the feeling of the loss of feeling. 
While Ratcliffe’s work does touch on this, he character-
ises it as another kind of existential feeling, arguing that 
the loss of feeling is, in fact, a feeling of the loss of feeling, 
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ing the depressed person to be more easily affected by 
negative events – thereby becoming more susceptible to 
sadness, despair and related emotions – it instead causes 
the depressed person to be less emotionally affected by 
their context in general. In other words, depression, as a 
mood, reduces the degree to which one is affected by, 
and has emotional responses to, one’s world. My own 
account, by contrast, appeals to the same phenomenon 
– low emotional sensitivity to context – but does not ex-
plain this reduction in sensitivity by appealing to the dis-
tinctiveness of a particular mood. Rather, I argue that it 
is the capacity to be situated in and attuned to the world 
through a mood in general that is an essential charac-
teristic of depression, which explains the low emotional 
sensitivity to context.
To return to the above discussion of the easily observable 
versus the essential characteristics of depression, the ac-
count I offer here portrays a degradation of Befindlichkeit, 
or a diminished capacity for being situated in and attuned 
through moods, as an essential characteristic of depres-
sion. The particular kinds of moods that may often mani-
fest in depression, such as sadness, hopelessness, or guilt, 
are considered non-essential because their manifestation 
is not a necessary feature of a depressive episode (this is, 
of course, in contrast to the DSM characterisation). “De-
pressed mood”, then, should be redefined as a lowering 
or diminishing of the intensity of moods as a whole, and 
not as a particular kind of mood.
The phenomenology of mania
Continuing from the account of depression I have 
sketched here, we can reconsider the phenomenon of 
mania from a phenomenological perspective. In review-
ing the criteria for a manic episode listed in the DSM-5, 
it seems that particular kinds of moods are considered 
essential characteristics of a manic episode. While the 
depressed person is said to feel sad, empty, or guilty, 
the manic person is described as displaying an elevated, 
expansive, or irritable mood (although the latter clearly 
holds a secondary status, as is evidenced by the qualifi-
cation that the person must present with four, rather than 
three, additional symptoms if her mood is only irritable, 
rather than elevated or expansive).
If we reconsider mania in light of the phenomenological 
account of depression given above, we can bring into 
question to what an elevated or expansive mood actually 
refers. Are these kinds of moods, in the way that sadness 
and guilt are kinds of moods? Or is the reference to el-
evated and expansive moods similar to my reinterpreta-
tion of “depressed mood”? If it is the latter, this forces us 
to rethink our conception of the essential characteristics 
of mania as portrayed in both popular culture and profes-
sional psychiatry.
cording to Heidegger, Befindlichkeit, which refers to the 
fact that at any time we find ourselves always already 
situated in and attuned to the world, is a categorial char-
acteristic of human existence. That is to say, it refers to 
an essential feature of human existence that is itself a cat-
egory that encompasses a certain group of phenomena. 
The phenomena that fall into the category of Befindli-
chkeit are Stimmungen, or moods. Moods, according to 
Heidegger, are particular ways of finding ourselves in the 
world, and determine the ways we can be affected by this 
world. The relationship between these terms is, then, that 
Befindlichkeit refers to the category of moods as a whole, 
while a Stimmung is a particular mood, and thus a par-
ticular way of being situated in and attuned to the world.
By following this distinction, we can see that the affective 
changes expressed in the DSM, as well as in the work of 
Ratcliffe, are of a fundamentally different kind from the af-
fective changes I have discussed in my own account. If we 
understand “depressed mood” as a kind of mood, then it 
is a shift in what Heidegger refers to as Stimmung. Depres-
sion, characterised in this way, should be understood as 
a distinctive mode of being situated in and attuned to the 
world. However, if we understand “depressed mood” as a 
diminished capacity to have moods, then it is a shift in what 
Heidegger refers to as Befindlichkeit. Depression, charac-
terised in this way, should be understood as a diminishing 
of the intensity of moods as a whole. (It should also be not-
ed that the shift I am proposing here is in some ways alien 
to Heidegger’s own account. Heidegger does not seem to 
allow for the possibility of changes in the degree to which 
one is situated in and attuned to the world. Rather, he only 
allows for changes from one mood to another.)
Of course, these two accounts are not mutually exclu-
sive. Moods with diminished intensity are still moods. It 
is possible for a depressed person to be situated and at-
tuned through a dulled or blunted mood of guilt, hope-
lessness, or sadness. However, this does not imply that 
any of these moods should be considered an essential 
characteristic of depression. Rather, the fact that all 
moods are, for the depressed person, dulled or blunted, 
is an essential characteristic. In light of this, if “depressed 
mood” is to remain an essential characteristic of depres-
sion, it should be redefined as a decrease in the intensity 
of moods as a whole − not as an ambiguous set of moods 
that includes sadness, hopelessness and guilt.
A similar account of depression has arisen from psycho-
logical research on what is referred to as emotion con-
text insensitivity 41 42. As Jonathan Rottenberg explains, 
“depression flattens the emotional landscape, greatly 
constricting the range of emotional reactions to differing 
emotional contexts”  41. This account, however, differs 
from my own in one important respect. According to Rot-
tenberg and colleagues, depression is still a distinctive 
mood. What makes it distinctive is that, rather than caus-
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of mixed states in light of the phenomenological account 
of depression and mania offered here. 
Dissolving the paradox of mixed states
To reiterate, mixed states are defined as cases in which 
one meets the full criteria for a depressive episode while 
exhibiting manic symptoms, or cases in which one meets 
the full criteria for a manic episode while exhibiting de-
pressive symptoms. The paradox, then, arises in light 
of the fact that depression and mania are conceived of 
as polar opposites. The possibility of having symptoms, 
not to mention essential characteristics, of one kind of 
episode manifesting in the midst of the other seems, on 
the face of it, paradoxical. My solution to this appar-
ent contradiction, unlike the solutions discussed at the 
beginning of this paper, is neither that depression and 
mania are polar opposites that may nevertheless overlap 
in cases of prolonged transition, nor that depression and 
mania are not, in fact, polar opposites. Rather, I argue 
that depression and mania should be understood as po-
lar opposites, and that they do not, in fact, manifest at 
the same time. The belief that mixed states are possible 
stems from a misunderstanding of the essential features 
of depression and mania.
As I have argued, the affective dimensions of both depres-
sion and mania should not be characterised as particular 
moods, or even as general kinds of moods, such as dys-
phoric or euphoric moods. Instead, the affective dimen-
sions of these states should be characterised as changes 
in what Heidegger refers to as Befindlichkeit, which refers 
to the fact that we always already find ourselves situated 
in and attuned to the world through a mood. Depression, 
under this account, is characterised by a diminished or 
eroded intensity of moods. This results in low emotional 
reactivity – as evidenced by the fact that people in depres-
sive episodes are largely unaffected by the world around 
them. Mania, by contrast, is characterised by an intensifi-
cation of moods. This results in emotional hyper-reactivity 
– as evidenced by the fact that people in manic episodes 
can be profoundly affected by the world around them.
It follows from this recharacterisation of the essential fea-
tures of depression and mania that many of the symptoms 
we considered constitutive of mixed episodes should not 
be understood as playing any such role. Because no par-
ticular moods, or even kinds of moods, constitute essen-
tial features of depression or mania, they cannot be used 
as evidence of mixed episodes. In other words, sadness, 
guilt and related moods and emotions should not be con-
sidered legitimate symptoms of depression. Euphoria and 
excessive cheerfulness, in turn, should not be considered 
legitimate symptoms of mania. It follows from this that 
these symptoms should not only be abolished from dis-
cussions of the classification of mixed states, but should 
The further descriptions of a manic episode offered in 
the DSM-5 refer to the manic mood as “euphoric, exces-
sively cheerful, high, or ‘feeling on top of the world’” 6. 
However, while these constitute the popular concep-
tion of the affective dimension of mania, the DSM-5 also 
states, “Rapid shifts in mood over brief periods of time 
may occur and are referred to as lability (i.e. the alter-
nation among euphoria, dysphoria, and irritability)” 6. In 
other words, the DSM-5 describes mania as characterised 
both by a certain kind of mood (e.g. euphoria, or exces-
sive cheerfulness) and by increased lability, or the ease 
and frequency with which moods change over.
This is again similar to the DSM’s characterisation of the 
affective dimension of depression. Depression, accord-
ing to the DSM, is characterised by particular moods, but 
may also be characterised by a loss of feeling. The DSM’s 
characterisation of mania, by comparison, includes refer-
ences to particular moods, but also to the fact that these 
moods may change rapidly.
To clarify this characterisation, we can reconceive ma-
nia along the same lines as that of depression. If depres-
sion is a diminishment of Befindlichkeit, or a decrease 
in the degree to which we find ourselves situated in and 
attuned to the world, then we might understand mania 
as an amplification or intensification of Befindlichkeit. 
What would follow from such an existential shift? One 
thing that would be likely to follow is that a person in 
the midst of a manic episode will be profoundly affected 
by the world around them. Persons, events and even 
objects appear as more meaningful (whether positively 
or negatively), affecting the person to a greater degree. 
In the psychological and psychiatric literature, this is re-
ferred to as emotional reactivity. At least two psychiatric 
studies have shown that a fundamental characteristic of 
both manic and mixed manic states is emotional hyper-
reactivity, rather than a distinctive mood tonality  15 17. 
This account is similar to the one I am proposing here, 
although it focuses on a narrower dimension of manic 
affectivity.
Another feature that would be likely to follow from an 
intensification of the existential structure of Befindlichkeit 
is the lability of mood, or the ease with which moods 
change over. This feature of manic states, as mentioned 
above, is discussed in the DSM-5 (however, it does not 
actually make it into the diagnostic criteria, so the au-
thors of the DSM-5 may not consider it to be an essential 
feature). And it is also proposed as an important charac-
teristic of mania in a number of psychiatric and psycho-
logical studies 14 17 20 22.
These reformulations of the essential characteristics of 
both depression and mania, while perhaps of interest in 
their own right, may be able to be applied in the context 
of other issues is psychopathology and psychiatric clas-
sification. In the following section, I address the paradox 
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also be removed from the symptomatology of pure manic 
and depressive states.
Conclusion
In summary, I have considered the paradox of mixed 
manic and depressive states from the perspective of con-
temporary phenomenological psychopathology. I argued 
that contemporary psychiatric classification in the DSM-
5 privileges easily observable symptoms while neglecting 
essential features of disorders. Furthermore, the authors 
of the DSM-5 seem to portray their symptomatology as 
capturing the essential features of disorders, thereby sedi-
menting the problematic nature of their system of clas-
sification. I followed this discussion with an illustration 
of how philosophical phenomenology can assist in the 
project of separating essential from non-essential features 
of a disorder by offering more accurate descriptions of 
disordered subjectivity that can, in turn, be used to draw 
more accurate boundaries between categories of dis-
order. Finally, I argued that the phenomenological ac-
counts of the affective dimensions of depression and ma-
nia I offered in this paper help us overcome the apparent 
paradox of mixed states.
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